seccomp(2) — Linux manual page


SECCOMP(2)                Linux Programmer's Manual               SECCOMP(2)

NAME         top

       seccomp - operate on Secure Computing state of the process

SYNOPSIS         top

       #include <linux/seccomp.h>
       #include <linux/filter.h>
       #include <linux/audit.h>
       #include <linux/signal.h>
       #include <sys/ptrace.h>

       int seccomp(unsigned int operation, unsigned int flags, void *args);

DESCRIPTION         top

       The seccomp() system call operates on the Secure Computing (seccomp)
       state of the calling process.

       Currently, Linux supports the following operation values:

              The only system calls that the calling thread is permitted to
              make are read(2), write(2), _exit(2) (but not exit_group(2)),
              and sigreturn(2).  Other system calls result in the delivery
              of a SIGKILL signal.  Strict secure computing mode is useful
              for number-crunching applications that may need to execute
              untrusted byte code, perhaps obtained by reading from a pipe
              or socket.

              Note that although the calling thread can no longer call
              sigprocmask(2), it can use sigreturn(2) to block all signals
              apart from SIGKILL and SIGSTOP.  This means that alarm(2) (for
              example) is not sufficient for restricting the process's
              execution time.  Instead, to reliably terminate the process,
              SIGKILL must be used.  This can be done by using
              timer_create(2) with SIGEV_SIGNAL and sigev_signo set to
              SIGKILL, or by using setrlimit(2) to set the hard limit for

              This operation is available only if the kernel is configured
              with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled.

              The value of flags must be 0, and args must be NULL.

              This operation is functionally identical to the call:

                  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT);

              The system calls allowed are defined by a pointer to a Berke‐
              ley Packet Filter (BPF) passed via args.  This argument is a
              pointer to a struct sock_fprog; it can be designed to filter
              arbitrary system calls and system call arguments.  If the fil‐
              ter is invalid, seccomp() fails, returning EINVAL in errno.

              If fork(2) or clone(2) is allowed by the filter, any child
              processes will be constrained to the same system call filters
              as the parent.  If execve(2) is allowed, the existing filters
              will be preserved across a call to execve(2).

              In order to use the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation, either
              the calling thread must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in
              its user namespace, or the thread must already have the
              no_new_privs bit set.  If that bit was not already set by an
              ancestor of this thread, the thread must make the following

                  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1);

              Otherwise, the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation fails and re‐
              turns EACCES in errno.  This requirement ensures that an un‐
              privileged process cannot apply a malicious filter and then
              invoke a set-user-ID or other privileged program using
              execve(2), thus potentially compromising that program.  (Such
              a malicious filter might, for example, cause an attempt to use
              setuid(2) to set the caller's user IDs to nonzero values to
              instead return 0 without actually making the system call.
              Thus, the program might be tricked into retaining superuser
              privileges in circumstances where it is possible to influence
              it to do dangerous things because it did not actually drop

              If prctl(2) or seccomp() is allowed by the attached filter,
              further filters may be added.  This will increase evaluation
              time, but allows for further reduction of the attack surface
              during execution of a thread.

              The SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation is available only if the
              kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER enabled.

              When flags is 0, this operation is functionally identical to
              the call:

                  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, args);

              The recognized flags are:

                     When adding a new filter, synchronize all other threads
                     of the calling process to the same seccomp filter tree.
                     A "filter tree" is the ordered list of filters attached
                     to a thread.  (Attaching identical filters in separate
                     seccomp() calls results in different filters from this

                     If any thread cannot synchronize to the same filter
                     tree, the call will not attach the new seccomp filter,
                     and will fail, returning the first thread ID found that
                     cannot synchronize.  Synchronization will fail if an‐
                     other thread in the same process is in SEC‐
                     COMP_MODE_STRICT or if it has attached new seccomp fil‐
                     ters to itself, diverging from the calling thread's
                     filter tree.

              SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (since Linux 4.14)
                     All filter return actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
                     should be logged.  An administrator may override this
                     filter flag by preventing specific actions from being
                     logged via the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged

              SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (since Linux 4.17)
                     Disable Speculative Store Bypass mitigation.

       SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL (since Linux 4.14)
              Test to see if an action is supported by the kernel.  This op‐
              eration is helpful to confirm that the kernel knows of a more
              recently added filter return action since the kernel treats
              all unknown actions as SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS.

              The value of flags must be 0, and args must be a pointer to an
              unsigned 32-bit filter return action.

       When adding filters via SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, args points to a
       filter program:

           struct sock_fprog {
               unsigned short      len;    /* Number of BPF instructions */
               struct sock_filter *filter; /* Pointer to array of
                                              BPF instructions */

       Each program must contain one or more BPF instructions:

           struct sock_filter {            /* Filter block */
               __u16 code;                 /* Actual filter code */
               __u8  jt;                   /* Jump true */
               __u8  jf;                   /* Jump false */
               __u32 k;                    /* Generic multiuse field */

       When executing the instructions, the BPF program operates on the sys‐
       tem call information made available (i.e., use the BPF_ABS addressing
       mode) as a (read-only) buffer of the following form:

           struct seccomp_data {
               int   nr;                   /* System call number */
               __u32 arch;                 /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value
                                              (see <linux/audit.h>) */
               __u64 instruction_pointer;  /* CPU instruction pointer */
               __u64 args[6];              /* Up to 6 system call arguments */

       Because numbering of system calls varies between architectures and
       some architectures (e.g., x86-64) allow user-space code to use the
       calling conventions of multiple architectures (and the convention be‐
       ing used may vary over the life of a process that uses execve(2) to
       execute binaries that employ the different conventions), it is usu‐
       ally necessary to verify the value of the arch field.

       It is strongly recommended to use an allow-list approach whenever
       possible because such an approach is more robust and simple.  A deny-
       list will have to be updated whenever a potentially dangerous system
       call is added (or a dangerous flag or option if those are deny-
       listed), and it is often possible to alter the representation of a
       value without altering its meaning, leading to a deny-list bypass.
       See also Caveats below.

       The arch field is not unique for all calling conventions.  The x86-64
       ABI and the x32 ABI both use AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 as arch, and they run
       on the same processors.  Instead, the mask __X32_SYSCALL_BIT is used
       on the system call number to tell the two ABIs apart.

       This means that a policy must either deny all syscalls with
       __X32_SYSCALL_BIT or it must recognize syscalls with and without
       __X32_SYSCALL_BIT set.  A list of system calls to be denied based on
       nr that does not also contain nr values with __X32_SYSCALL_BIT set
       can be bypassed by a malicious program that sets __X32_SYSCALL_BIT.

       Additionally, kernels prior to Linux 5.4 incorrectly permitted nr in
       the ranges 512-547 as well as the corresponding non-x32 syscalls ORed
       with __X32_SYSCALL_BIT.  For example, nr == 521 and nr == (101 |
       __X32_SYSCALL_BIT) would result in invocations of ptrace(2) with po‐
       tentially confused x32-vs-x86_64 semantics in the kernel.  Policies
       intended to work on kernels before Linux 5.4 must ensure that they
       deny or otherwise correctly handle these system calls.  On Linux 5.4
       and newer, such system calls will fail with the error ENOSYS, without
       doing anything.

       The instruction_pointer field provides the address of the machine-
       language instruction that performed the system call.  This might be
       useful in conjunction with the use of /proc/[pid]/maps to perform
       checks based on which region (mapping) of the program made the system
       call.  (Probably, it is wise to lock down the mmap(2) and mprotect(2)
       system calls to prevent the program from subverting such checks.)

       When checking values from args, keep in mind that arguments are often
       silently truncated before being processed, but after the seccomp
       check.  For example, this happens if the i386 ABI is used on an
       x86-64 kernel: although the kernel will normally not look beyond the
       32 lowest bits of the arguments, the values of the full 64-bit regis‐
       ters will be present in the seccomp data.  A less surprising example
       is that if the x86-64 ABI is used to perform a system call that takes
       an argument of type int, the more-significant half of the argument
       register is ignored by the system call, but visible in the seccomp

       A seccomp filter returns a 32-bit value consisting of two parts: the
       most significant 16 bits (corresponding to the mask defined by the
       constant SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL) contain one of the "action" values
       listed below; the least significant 16-bits (defined by the constant
       SECCOMP_RET_DATA) are "data" to be associated with this return value.

       If multiple filters exist, they are all executed, in reverse order of
       their addition to the filter tree—that is, the most recently in‐
       stalled filter is executed first.  (Note that all filters will be
       called even if one of the earlier filters returns SECCOMP_RET_KILL.
       This is done to simplify the kernel code and to provide a tiny speed-
       up in the execution of sets of filters by avoiding a check for this
       uncommon case.)  The return value for the evaluation of a given sys‐
       tem call is the first-seen action value of highest precedence (along
       with its accompanying data) returned by execution of all of the fil‐

       In decreasing order of precedence, the action values that may be re‐
       turned by a seccomp filter are:

       SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS (since Linux 4.14)
              This value results in immediate termination of the process,
              with a core dump.  The system call is not executed.  By con‐
              trast with SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD below, all threads in the
              thread group are terminated.  (For a discussion of thread
              groups, see the description of the CLONE_THREAD flag in

              The process terminates as though killed by a SIGSYS signal.
              Even if a signal handler has been registered for SIGSYS, the
              handler will be ignored in this case and the process always
              terminates.  To a parent process that is waiting on this
              process (using waitpid(2) or similar), the returned wstatus
              will indicate that its child was terminated as though by a
              SIGSYS signal.

              This value results in immediate termination of the thread that
              made the system call.  The system call is not executed.  Other
              threads in the same thread group will continue to execute.

              The thread terminates as though killed by a SIGSYS signal.
              See SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS above.

              Before Linux 4.11, any process terminated in this way would
              not trigger a coredump (even though SIGSYS is documented in
              signal(7) as having a default action of termination with a
              core dump).  Since Linux 4.11, a single-threaded process will
              dump core if terminated in this way.

              With the addition of SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS in Linux 4.14,
              SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD was added as a synonym for SEC‐
              COMP_RET_KILL, in order to more clearly distinguish the two

              Note: the use of SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD to kill a single
              thread in a multithreaded process is likely to leave the
              process in a permanently inconsistent and possibly corrupt

              This value results in the kernel sending a thread-directed
              SIGSYS signal to the triggering thread.  (The system call is
              not executed.)  Various fields will be set in the siginfo_t
              structure (see sigaction(2)) associated with signal:

              *  si_signo will contain SIGSYS.

              *  si_call_addr will show the address of the system call in‐

              *  si_syscall and si_arch will indicate which system call was

              *  si_code will contain SYS_SECCOMP.

              *  si_errno will contain the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the
                 filter return value.

              The program counter will be as though the system call happened
              (i.e., the program counter will not point to the system call
              instruction).  The return value register will contain an ar‐
              chitecture-dependent value; if resuming execution, set it to
              something appropriate for the system call.  (The architecture
              dependency is because replacing it with ENOSYS could overwrite
              some useful information.)

              This value results in the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the fil‐
              ter's return value being passed to user space as the errno
              value without executing the system call.

              When returned, this value will cause the kernel to attempt to
              notify a ptrace(2)-based tracer prior to executing the system
              call.  If there is no tracer present, the system call is not
              executed and returns a failure status with errno set to

              A tracer will be notified if it requests PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
              using ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS).  The tracer will be notified
              of a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP and the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of
              the filter's return value will be available to the tracer via

              The tracer can skip the system call by changing the system
              call number to -1.  Alternatively, the tracer can change the
              system call requested by changing the system call to a valid
              system call number.  If the tracer asks to skip the system
              call, then the system call will appear to return the value
              that the tracer puts in the return value register.

              Before kernel 4.8, the seccomp check will not be run again af‐
              ter the tracer is notified.  (This means that, on older ker‐
              nels, seccomp-based sandboxes must not allow use of
              ptrace(2)—even of other sandboxed processes—without extreme
              care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape from the sec‐
              comp sandbox.)

              Note that a tracer process will not be notified if another
              filter returns an action value with a precedence greater than

       SECCOMP_RET_LOG (since Linux 4.14)
              This value results in the system call being executed after the
              filter return action is logged.  An administrator may override
              the logging of this action via the /proc/sys/kernel/sec‐
              comp/actions_logged file.

              This value results in the system call being executed.

       If an action value other than one of the above is specified, then the
       filter action is treated as either SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS (since
       Linux 4.14) or SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (in Linux 4.13 and earlier).

   /proc interfaces
       The files in the directory /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp provide addi‐
       tional seccomp information and configuration:

       actions_avail (since Linux 4.14)
              A read-only ordered list of seccomp filter return actions in
              string form.  The ordering, from left-to-right, is in decreas‐
              ing order of precedence.  The list represents the set of sec‐
              comp filter return actions supported by the kernel.

       actions_logged (since Linux 4.14)
              A read-write ordered list of seccomp filter return actions
              that are allowed to be logged.  Writes to the file do not need
              to be in ordered form but reads from the file will be ordered
              in the same way as the actions_avail file.

              It is important to note that the value of actions_logged does
              not prevent certain filter return actions from being logged
              when the audit subsystem is configured to audit a task.  If
              the action is not found in the actions_logged file, the final
              decision on whether to audit the action for that task is ulti‐
              mately left up to the audit subsystem to decide for all filter
              return actions other than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW.

              The "allow" string is not accepted in the actions_logged file
              as it is not possible to log SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions.  At‐
              tempting to write "allow" to the file will fail with the error

   Audit logging of seccomp actions
       Since Linux 4.14, the kernel provides the facility to log the actions
       returned by seccomp filters in the audit log.  The kernel makes the
       decision to log an action based on the action type,  whether or not
       the action is present in the actions_logged file, and whether kernel
       auditing is enabled (e.g., via the kernel boot option audit=1).  The
       rules are as follows:

       *  If the action is SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, the action is not logged.

       *  Otherwise, if the action is either SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS or
          SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, and that action appears in the ac‐
          tions_logged file, the action is logged.

       *  Otherwise, if the filter has requested logging (the SECCOMP_FIL‐
          TER_FLAG_LOG flag) and the action appears in the actions_logged
          file, the action is logged.

       *  Otherwise, if kernel auditing is enabled and the process is being
          audited (autrace(8)), the action is logged.

       *  Otherwise, the action is not logged.

RETURN VALUE         top

       On success, seccomp() returns 0.  On error, if
       SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC was used, the return value is the ID of the
       thread that caused the synchronization failure.  (This ID is a kernel
       thread ID of the type returned by clone(2) and gettid(2).)  On other
       errors, -1 is returned, and errno is set to indicate the cause of the

ERRORS         top

       seccomp() can fail for the following reasons:

       EACCES The caller did not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its
              user namespace, or had not set no_new_privs before using

       EFAULT args was not a valid address.

       EINVAL operation is unknown or is not supported by this kernel
              version or configuration.

       EINVAL The specified flags are invalid for the given operation.

       EINVAL operation included BPF_ABS, but the specified offset was not
              aligned to a 32-bit boundary or exceeded
              sizeof(struct seccomp_data).

       EINVAL A secure computing mode has already been set, and operation
              differs from the existing setting.

       EINVAL operation specified SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, but the filter
              program pointed to by args was not valid or the length of the
              filter program was zero or exceeded BPF_MAXINSNS (4096)

       ENOMEM Out of memory.

       ENOMEM The total length of all filter programs attached to the
              calling thread would exceed MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH (32768)
              instructions.  Note that for the purposes of calculating this
              limit, each already existing filter program incurs an overhead
              penalty of 4 instructions.

              operation specified SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, but the kernel
              does not support the filter return action specified by args.

       ESRCH  Another thread caused a failure during thread sync, but its ID
              could not be determined.

VERSIONS         top

       The seccomp() system call first appeared in Linux 3.17.

CONFORMING TO         top

       The seccomp() system call is a nonstandard Linux extension.

NOTES         top

       Rather than hand-coding seccomp filters as shown in the example
       below, you may prefer to employ the libseccomp library, which
       provides a front-end for generating seccomp filters.

       The Seccomp field of the /proc/[pid]/status file provides a method of
       viewing the seccomp mode of a process; see proc(5).

       seccomp() provides a superset of the functionality provided by the
       prctl(2) PR_SET_SECCOMP operation (which does not support flags).

       Since Linux 4.4, the ptrace(2) PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER operation
       can be used to dump a process's seccomp filters.

   Architecture support for seccomp BPF
       Architecture support for seccomp BPF filtering is available on the
       following architectures:

       *  x86-64, i386, x32 (since Linux 3.5)
       *  ARM (since Linux 3.8)
       *  s390 (since Linux 3.8)
       *  MIPS (since Linux 3.16)
       *  ARM-64 (since Linux 3.19)
       *  PowerPC (since Linux 4.3)
       *  Tile (since Linux 4.3)
       *  PA-RISC (since Linux 4.6)

       There are various subtleties to consider when applying seccomp
       filters to a program, including the following:

       *  Some traditional system calls have user-space implementations in
          the vdso(7) on many architectures.  Notable examples include
          clock_gettime(2), gettimeofday(2), and time(2).  On such
          architectures, seccomp filtering for these system calls will have
          no effect.  (However, there are cases where the vdso(7)
          implementations may fall back to invoking the true system call, in
          which case seccomp filters would see the system call.)

       *  Seccomp filtering is based on system call numbers.  However,
          applications typically do not directly invoke system calls, but
          instead call wrapper functions in the C library which in turn
          invoke the system calls.  Consequently, one must be aware of the

          •  The glibc wrappers for some traditional system calls may
             actually employ system calls with different names in the
             kernel.  For example, the exit(2) wrapper function actually
             employs the exit_group(2) system call, and the fork(2) wrapper
             function actually calls clone(2).

          •  The behavior of wrapper functions may vary across
             architectures, according to the range of system calls provided
             on those architectures.  In other words, the same wrapper
             function may invoke different system calls on different

          •  Finally, the behavior of wrapper functions can change across
             glibc versions.  For example, in older versions, the glibc
             wrapper function for open(2) invoked the system call of the
             same name, but starting in glibc 2.26, the implementation
             switched to calling openat(2) on all architectures.

       The consequence of the above points is that it may be necessary to
       filter for a system call other than might be expected.  Various
       manual pages in Section 2 provide helpful details about the
       differences between wrapper functions and the underlying system calls
       in subsections entitled C library/kernel differences.

       Furthermore, note that the application of seccomp filters even risks
       causing bugs in an application, when the filters cause unexpected
       failures for legitimate operations that the application might need to
       perform.  Such bugs may not easily be discovered when testing the
       seccomp filters if the bugs occur in rarely used application code

   Seccomp-specific BPF details
       Note the following BPF details specific to seccomp filters:

       *  The BPF_H and BPF_B size modifiers are not supported: all
          operations must load and store (4-byte) words (BPF_W).

       *  To access the contents of the seccomp_data buffer, use the BPF_ABS
          addressing mode modifier.

       *  The BPF_LEN addressing mode modifier yields an immediate mode
          operand whose value is the size of the seccomp_data buffer.

EXAMPLES         top

       The program below accepts four or more arguments.  The first three
       arguments are a system call number, a numeric architecture
       identifier, and an error number.  The program uses these values to
       construct a BPF filter that is used at run time to perform the
       following checks:

       [1] If the program is not running on the specified architecture, the
           BPF filter causes system calls to fail with the error ENOSYS.

       [2] If the program attempts to execute the system call with the
           specified number, the BPF filter causes the system call to fail,
           with errno being set to the specified error number.

       The remaining command-line arguments specify the pathname and
       additional arguments of a program that the example program should
       attempt to execute using execv(3) (a library function that employs
       the execve(2) system call).  Some example runs of the program are
       shown below.

       First, we display the architecture that we are running on (x86-64)
       and then construct a shell function that looks up system call numbers
       on this architecture:

           $ uname -m
           $ syscall_nr() {
               cat /usr/src/linux/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | \
               awk '$2 != "x32" && $3 == "'$1'" { print $1 }'

       When the BPF filter rejects a system call (case [2] above), it causes
       the system call to fail with the error number specified on the com‐
       mand line.  In the experiments shown here, we'll use error number 99:

           $ errno 99
           EADDRNOTAVAIL 99 Cannot assign requested address

       In the following example, we attempt to run the command whoami(1),
       but the BPF filter rejects the execve(2) system call, so that the
       command is not even executed:

           $ syscall_nr execve
           $ ./a.out
           Usage: ./a.out <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]
           Hint for <arch>: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x40000003
                            AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0xC000003E
           $ ./a.out 59 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami
           execv: Cannot assign requested address

       In the next example, the BPF filter rejects the write(2) system call,
       so that, although it is successfully started, the whoami(1) command
       is not able to write output:

           $ syscall_nr write
           $ ./a.out 1 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami

       In the final example, the BPF filter rejects a system call that is
       not used by the whoami(1) command, so it is able to successfully exe‐
       cute and produce output:

           $ syscall_nr preadv
           $ ./a.out 295 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami

   Program source
       #include <errno.h>
       #include <stddef.h>
       #include <stdio.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>
       #include <unistd.h>
       #include <linux/audit.h>
       #include <linux/filter.h>
       #include <linux/seccomp.h>
       #include <sys/prctl.h>

       #define X32_SYSCALL_BIT 0x40000000
       #define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))

       static int
       install_filter(int syscall_nr, int t_arch, int f_errno)
           unsigned int upper_nr_limit = 0xffffffff;

           /* Assume that AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 means the normal x86-64 ABI
              (in the x32 ABI, all system calls have bit 30 set in the
              'nr' field, meaning the numbers are >= X32_SYSCALL_BIT) */
           if (t_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64)
               upper_nr_limit = X32_SYSCALL_BIT - 1;

           struct sock_filter filter[] = {
               /* [0] Load architecture from 'seccomp_data' buffer into
                      accumulator */
               BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
                        (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),

               /* [1] Jump forward 5 instructions if architecture does not
                      match 't_arch' */
               BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, t_arch, 0, 5),

               /* [2] Load system call number from 'seccomp_data' buffer into
                      accumulator */
               BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
                        (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),

               /* [3] Check ABI - only needed for x86-64 in deny-list use
                      cases.  Use BPF_JGT instead of checking against the bit
                      mask to avoid having to reload the syscall number. */
               BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K, upper_nr_limit, 3, 0),

               /* [4] Jump forward 1 instruction if system call number
                      does not match 'syscall_nr' */
               BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, syscall_nr, 0, 1),

               /* [5] Matching architecture and system call: don't execute
                  the system call, and return 'f_errno' in 'errno' */
               BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K,
                        SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | (f_errno & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),

               /* [6] Destination of system call number mismatch: allow other
                      system calls */

               /* [7] Destination of architecture mismatch: kill process */

           struct sock_fprog prog = {
               .len = ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
               .filter = filter,

           if (seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog)) {
               return 1;

           return 0;

       main(int argc, char **argv)
           if (argc < 5) {
               fprintf(stderr, "Usage: "
                       "%s <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]\n"
                       "Hint for <arch>: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x%X\n"
                       "                 AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0x%X\n"
                       "\n", argv[0], AUDIT_ARCH_I386, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64);

           if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {

           if (install_filter(strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0),
                              strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0),
                              strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0)))

           execv(argv[4], &argv[4]);

SEE ALSO         top

       bpfc(1), strace(1), bpf(2), prctl(2), ptrace(2), sigaction(2),
       proc(5), signal(7), socket(7)

       Various pages from the libseccomp library, including:
       scmp_sys_resolver(1), seccomp_export_bpf(3), seccomp_init(3),
       seccomp_load(3), and seccomp_rule_add(3).

       The kernel source files Documentation/networking/filter.txt and
       Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst (or
       Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt before Linux 4.13).

       McCanne, S. and Jacobson, V. (1992) The BSD Packet Filter: A New
       Architecture for User-level Packet Capture, Proceedings of the USENIX
       Winter 1993 Conference 

COLOPHON         top

       This page is part of release 5.09 of the Linux man-pages project.  A
       description of the project, information about reporting bugs, and the
       latest version of this page, can be found at

Linux                            2020-11-01                       SECCOMP(2)

Pages that refer to this page: strace(1)bpf(2)prctl(2)ptrace(2)rt_sigaction(2)sigaction(2)socketcall(2)syscalls(2)seccomp_api_get(3)seccomp_api_set(3)seccomp_attr_get(3)seccomp_attr_set(3)proc(5)procfs(5)capabilities(7)signal(7)vdso(7)