|
HTML rendering created 2025-02-02 by Michael Kerrisk, author of The Linux Programming Interface. For details of in-depth Linux/UNIX system programming training courses that I teach, look here. Hosting by jambit GmbH. |
|
|
NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | LIMITATIONS | COMPATIBILITY | UNLOCKING | SIMPLE ENROLLMENT | PKCS#11 ENROLLMENT | FIDO2 ENROLLMENT | TPM2 ENROLLMENT | OTHER OPTIONS | CREDENTIALS | EXIT STATUS | EXAMPLES | SEE ALSO | NOTES | COLOPHON |
|
|
|
SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1) systemd-cryptenroll SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)
systemd-cryptenroll - Enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2, TPM2 token/devices to
LUKS2 encrypted volumes
systemd-cryptenroll [OPTIONS...] [DEVICE]
systemd-cryptenroll is a tool for enrolling hardware security
tokens and devices into a LUKS2 encrypted volume, which may then
be used to unlock the volume during boot. Specifically, it
supports tokens and credentials of the following kind to be
enrolled:
1. PKCS#11 security tokens and smartcards that may carry an RSA
or EC key pair (e.g. various YubiKeys)
2. FIDO2 security tokens that implement the "hmac-secret"
extension (most FIDO2 keys, including YubiKeys)
3. TPM2 security devices
4. Regular passphrases
5. Recovery keys. These are similar to regular passphrases,
however are randomly generated on the computer and thus
generally have higher entropy than user-chosen passphrases.
Their character set has been designed to ensure they are easy
to type in, while having high entropy. They may also be
scanned off screen using QR codes. Recovery keys may be used
for unlocking LUKS2 volumes wherever passphrases are accepted.
They are intended to be used in combination with an enrolled
hardware security token, as a recovery option when the token
is lost.
In addition, the tool may be used to enumerate currently enrolled
security tokens and wipe a subset of them. The latter may be
combined with the enrollment operation of a new security token, in
order to update or replace enrollments.
The tool supports only LUKS2 volumes, as it stores token
meta-information in the LUKS2 JSON token area, which is not
available in other encryption formats.
systemd-cryptsetup operates on the device backing /var/ if no
device is specified explicitly, and no wipe operation is
requested. (Note that in the typical case where /var/ is on the
same file system as the root file system, this hence enrolls a key
into the backing device of the root file system.)
TPM2 PCRs and policies
PCRs allow binding of the encryption of secrets to specific
software versions and system state, so that the enrolled key is
only accessible (may be "unsealed") if specific trusted software
and/or configuration is used. Such bindings may be created with
the option --tpm2-pcrs= described below.
Secrets may also be bound indirectly: a signed policy for a state
of some combination of PCR values is provided, and the secret is
bound to the public part of the key used to sign this policy. This
means that the owner of a key can generate a sequence of signed
policies, for specific software versions and system states, and
the secret can be decrypted as long as the machine state matches
one of those policies. For example, a vendor may provide such a
policy for each kernel+initrd update, allowing users to encrypt
secrets so that they can be decrypted when running any
kernel+initrd signed by the vendor. Such bindings may be created
with the options --tpm2-public-key=, --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=,
--tpm2-signature= described below.
See Linux TPM PCR Registry[1] for an authoritative list of PCRs
and how they are updated. The table below contains a quick
reference, describing in particular the PCRs modified by systemd.
Table 1. Well-known PCR Definitions
┌─────┬─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┐
│ PCR │ name │ Explanation │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 0 │ platform-code │ Core system │
│ │ │ firmware │
│ │ │ executable code; │
│ │ │ changes on │
│ │ │ firmware updates │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 1 │ platform-config │ Core system │
│ │ │ firmware data/host │
│ │ │ platform │
│ │ │ configuration; │
│ │ │ typically contains │
│ │ │ serial and model │
│ │ │ numbers, changes │
│ │ │ on basic │
│ │ │ hardware/CPU/RAM │
│ │ │ replacements │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 2 │ external-code │ Extended or │
│ │ │ pluggable │
│ │ │ executable code; │
│ │ │ includes option │
│ │ │ ROMs on pluggable │
│ │ │ hardware │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 3 │ external-config │ Extended or │
│ │ │ pluggable firmware │
│ │ │ data; includes │
│ │ │ information about │
│ │ │ pluggable hardware │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 4 │ boot-loader-code │ Boot loader and │
│ │ │ additional │
│ │ │ drivers, PE │
│ │ │ binaries invoked │
│ │ │ by the boot │
│ │ │ loader; changes on │
│ │ │ boot loader │
│ │ │ updates. │
│ │ │ sd-stub(7) │
│ │ │ measures system │
│ │ │ extension images │
│ │ │ read from the ESP │
│ │ │ here too (see │
│ │ │ systemd-sysext(8)). │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 5 │ boot-loader-config │ GPT/Partition │
│ │ │ table; changes when │
│ │ │ the partitions are │
│ │ │ added, modified, or │
│ │ │ removed │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 7 │ secure-boot-policy │ Secure Boot state; │
│ │ │ changes when UEFI │
│ │ │ SecureBoot mode is │
│ │ │ enabled/disabled, │
│ │ │ or firmware │
│ │ │ certificates (PK, │
│ │ │ KEK, db, dbx, ...) │
│ │ │ changes. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 9 │ kernel-initrd │ The Linux kernel │
│ │ │ measures all │
│ │ │ initrds it receives │
│ │ │ into this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 10 │ ima │ The IMA project │
│ │ │ measures its │
│ │ │ runtime state into │
│ │ │ this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 11 │ kernel-boot │ systemd-stub(7) │
│ │ │ measures the ELF │
│ │ │ kernel image, │
│ │ │ embedded initrd and │
│ │ │ other payload of │
│ │ │ the PE image it is │
│ │ │ placed in into this │
│ │ │ PCR. │
│ │ │ systemd-pcrphase.service(8) │
│ │ │ measures boot phase │
│ │ │ strings into this │
│ │ │ PCR at various │
│ │ │ milestones of the │
│ │ │ boot process. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 12 │ kernel-config │ systemd-boot(7) measures │
│ │ │ the kernel command line │
│ │ │ into this PCR. │
│ │ │ systemd-stub(7) measures │
│ │ │ any manually specified │
│ │ │ kernel command line (i.e. a │
│ │ │ kernel command line that │
│ │ │ overrides the one embedded │
│ │ │ in the unified PE image) │
│ │ │ and loaded credentials into │
│ │ │ this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 13 │ sysexts │ systemd-stub(7) measures │
│ │ │ any systemd-sysext(8) │
│ │ │ images it passes to the │
│ │ │ booted kernel into this │
│ │ │ PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 14 │ shim-policy │ The shim project measures │
│ │ │ its "MOK" certificates and │
│ │ │ hashes into this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 15 │ system-identity │ systemd-cryptsetup(8) │
│ │ │ optionally measures the │
│ │ │ volume key of activated │
│ │ │ LUKS volumes into this PCR. │
│ │ │ systemd-pcrmachine.service(8) │
│ │ │ measures the machine-id(5) │
│ │ │ into this PCR. │
│ │ │ systemd-pcrfs@.service(8) │
│ │ │ measures mount points, file │
│ │ │ system UUIDs, labels, │
│ │ │ partition UUIDs of the root │
│ │ │ and /var/ filesystems into │
│ │ │ this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 16 │ debug │ Debug │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
│ 23 │ application-support │ Application Support │
└─────┴─────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────┘
In general, encrypted volumes would be bound to some combination
of PCRs 7, 11, and 14 (if shim/MOK is used). In order to allow
firmware and OS version updates, it is typically not advisable to
use PCRs such as 0 and 2, since the program code they cover should
already be covered indirectly through the certificates measured
into PCR 7. Validation through certificates hashes is typically
preferable over validation through direct measurements as it is
less brittle in context of OS/firmware updates: the measurements
will change on every update, but signatures should remain
unchanged. See the Linux TPM PCR Registry[1] for more discussion.
Note that currently when enrolling a new key of one of the five
supported types listed above, it is required to first provide a
passphrase, a recovery key, a FIDO2 token, or a TPM2 key. It's
currently not supported to unlock a device with a PKCS#11 key in
order to enroll a new PKCS#11 key. Thus, if in future key
roll-over is desired it is generally recommended to ensure a
passphrase, a recovery key, a FIDO2 token, or a TPM2 key is always
enrolled.
Also note that support for enrolling multiple FIDO2 tokens is
currently limited. When multiple FIDO2 tokens are enrolled,
systemd-cryptsetup will perform pre-flight requests to attempt to
identify which of the enrolled tokens are currently plugged in.
However, this is not possible for FIDO2 tokens with user
verification (UV, usually via biometrics), in which case it will
fall back to attempting each enrolled token one by one. This will
result in multiple prompts for PIN and user verification. This
limitation does not apply to PKCS#11 tokens.
Security technology both in systemd and in the general industry
constantly evolves. In order to provide best security guarantees,
the way TPM2, FIDO2, PKCS#11 devices are enrolled is regularly
updated in newer versions of systemd. Whenever this happens the
following compatibility guarantees are given:
• Old enrollments continue to be supported and may be unlocked
with newer versions of systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8).
• The opposite is not guaranteed however: it might not be
possible to unlock volumes with enrollments done with a newer
version of systemd-cryptenroll with an older version of
systemd-cryptsetup.
That said, it is generally recommended to use matching versions of
systemd-cryptenroll and systemd-cryptsetup, since this is best
tested and supported.
It might be advisable to re-enroll existing enrollments to take
benefit of newer security features, as they are added to systemd.
The following options are understood that may be used to unlock
the device in preparation of the enrollment operations:
--unlock-key-file=PATH
Use a file instead of a password/passphrase read from stdin to
unlock the volume. Expects the PATH to the file containing
your key to unlock the volume. Currently there is nothing like
--key-file-offset= or --key-file-size= so this file has to
only contain the full key.
Added in version 252.
--unlock-fido2-device=PATH
Use a FIDO2 device instead of a password/passphrase read from
stdin to unlock the volume. Expects a hidraw device referring
to the FIDO2 device (e.g. /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the
special value "auto" may be specified, in order to
automatically determine the device node of a currently plugged
in security token (of which there must be exactly one). This
automatic discovery is unsupported if --fido2-device= option
is also specified. Note that currently FIDO2 devices enrolled
without an accompanying LUKS2 token (i.e.
--fido2-parameters-in-header=no) cannot be used for unlocking.
Added in version 253.
--unlock-tpm2-device=PATH
Use a TPM2 device instead of a password/passphrase read from
stdin to unlock the volume. Expects a device node path
referring to the TPM2 chip (e.g. /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively
the special value "auto" may be specified, in order to
automatically determine the device node of a currently
discovered TPM2 device (of which there must be exactly one).
Added in version 256.
The following options are understood that may be used to enroll
simple user input based unlocking:
--password
Enroll a regular password/passphrase. This command is mostly
equivalent to cryptsetup luksAddKey, however may be combined
with --wipe-slot= in one call, see below.
Added in version 248.
--recovery-key
Enroll a recovery key. Recovery keys are mostly identical to
passphrases, but are computer-generated instead of being
chosen by a human, and thus have a guaranteed high entropy.
The key uses a character set that is easy to type in, and may
be scanned off screen via a QR code.
Added in version 248.
The following option is understood that may be used to enroll
PKCS#11 tokens:
--pkcs11-token-uri=URI
Enroll a PKCS#11 security token or smartcard (e.g. a YubiKey).
Expects a PKCS#11 URI that allows finding an X.509 certificate
or a public key on the token. The URI must also be suitable to
find a related private key after changing the type of object
in it. Alternatively the special value "auto" may be
specified, in order to automatically determine the suitable
URI if a single security token containing a single key pair is
plugged in. The special value "list" may be used to enumerate
all suitable PKCS#11 tokens currently plugged in.
The PKCS#11 token must contain an RSA or EC key pair which
will be used to unlock a LUKS2 volume. For RSA, a randomly
generated volume key is encrypted with a public key in the
token, and stored in the LUKS2 JSON token header area. To
unlock a volume, the stored encrypted volume key will be
decrypted with a private key in the token. For ECC, ECDH
algorithm is used: we generate a pair of EC keys in the same
EC group, then derive a shared secret using the generated
private key and the public key in the token. The derived
shared secret is used as a volume key. The generated public
key is stored in the LUKS2 JSON token header area. The
generated private key is erased. To unlock a volume, we derive
the shared secret with the stored public key and a private key
in the token.
In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled PKCS#11
security token, specify the pkcs11-uri= option in the
respective /etc/crypttab line:
myvolume /dev/sda1 none pkcs11-uri=auto
See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab
line.
Added in version 248.
The following options are understood that may be used to enroll
FIDO2 tokens:
--fido2-device=PATH
Enroll a FIDO2 security token that implements the
"hmac-secret" extension (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a hidraw
device referring to the FIDO2 device (e.g. /dev/hidraw1).
Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in
order to automatically determine the device node of a
currently plugged in security token (of which there must be
exactly one). This automatic discovery is unsupported if
--unlock-fido2-device= option is also specified. The special
value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable FIDO2
tokens currently plugged in. Note that many hardware security
tokens that implement FIDO2 also implement the older PKCS#11
standard. Typically FIDO2 is preferable, given it is simpler
to use and more modern.
In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled FIDO2
security token, specify the fido2-device= option in the
respective /etc/crypttab line:
myvolume /dev/sda1 none fido2-device=auto
See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab
line.
Added in version 248.
--fido2-credential-algorithm=STRING
Specify COSE algorithm used in credential generation. The
default value is "es256". Supported values are "es256",
"rs256" and "eddsa".
"es256" denotes ECDSA over NIST P-256 with SHA-256. "rs256"
denotes 2048-bit RSA with PKCS#1.5 padding and SHA-256.
"eddsa" denotes EDDSA over Curve25519 with SHA-512.
Note that your authenticator may choose not to support some
algorithms.
Added in version 251.
--fido2-salt-file=PATH
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, specifies the path to a
file or an AF_UNIX socket from which we should read the salt
value to be used in the HMAC operation performed by the FIDO2
security token. If this option is not specified, the salt will
be randomly generated.
Added in version 257.
--fido2-parameters-in-header=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to
store FIDO2 parameters in a token in the LUKS2 superblock.
Defaults to "yes". If set to "no", the fido2-cid= option has
to be specified manually in the respective /etc/crypttab line
along with a key file. See crypttab(5) for details.
Added in version 257.
--fido2-with-client-pin=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to
require the user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume (the
FIDO2 "clientPin" feature). Defaults to "yes". (Note: this
setting is without effect if the security token does not
support the "clientPin" feature at all, or does not allow
enabling or disabling it.)
Added in version 249.
--fido2-with-user-presence=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to
require the user to verify presence (tap the token, the FIDO2
"up" feature) when unlocking the volume. Defaults to "yes".
(Note: this setting is without effect if the security token
does not support the "up" feature at all, or does not allow
enabling or disabling it.)
Added in version 249.
--fido2-with-user-verification=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to
require user verification when unlocking the volume (the FIDO2
"uv" feature). Defaults to "no". (Note: this setting is
without effect if the security token does not support the "uv"
feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.)
Added in version 249.
The following options are understood that may be used to enroll
TPM2 devices:
--tpm2-device=PATH
Enroll a TPM2 security chip. Expects a device node path
referring to the TPM2 chip (e.g. /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively
the special value "auto" may be specified, in order to
automatically determine the device node of a currently
discovered TPM2 device (of which there must be exactly one).
The special value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable
TPM2 devices currently discovered.
In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled TPM2
security chip, specify the tpm2-device= option in the
respective /etc/crypttab line:
myvolume /dev/sda1 none tpm2-device=auto
See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab
line.
Use --tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure which TPM2 PCR
indexes to bind the enrollment to.
Added in version 248.
--tpm2-device-key=PATH
Enroll a TPM2 security chip using its public key. Expects a
path referring to the TPM2 public key in TPM2B_PUBLIC format.
This cannot be used with --tpm2-device=, as it performs the
same operation, but without connecting to the TPM2 security
chip; instead the enrollment is calculated using the provided
TPM2 key. This is useful in situations where the TPM2 security
chip is not available at the time of enrollment.
The key, in most cases, should be the Storage Root Key (SRK)
from a local TPM2 security chip. If a key from a different
handle (not the SRK) is used, you must specify its handle
index using --tpm2-seal-key-handle=.
The systemd-tpm2-setup.service(8) service writes the SRK to
/run/systemd/tpm2-srk-public-key.tpm2b_public automatically
during boot, in the correct format.
Alternatively, you may use systemd-analyze srk to retrieve the
SRK from the TPM2 security chip explicitly. See
systemd-analyze(1) for details. Example:
systemd-analyze srk > srk.tpm2b_public
Added in version 255.
--tpm2-seal-key-handle=HANDLE
Configures which parent key to use for sealing, using the TPM
handle (index) of the key. This is used to "seal" (encrypt) a
secret and must be used later to "unseal" (decrypt) the
secret. Expects a hexadecimal 32bit integer, optionally
prefixed with "0x". Allowable values are any handle index in
the persistent ("0x81000000"-"0x81ffffff") or transient
("0x80000000"-"0x80ffffff") ranges. Since transient handles
are lost after a TPM reset, and may be flushed during TPM
context switching, they should not be used except for very
specific use cases, e.g. testing.
The default is the Storage Root Key (SRK) handle index
"0x81000001". A value of 0 will use the default. For the SRK
handle, a new key will be created and stored in the TPM if one
does not already exist; for any other handle, the key must
already exist in the TPM at the specified handle index.
This should not be changed unless you know what you are doing.
Added in version 255.
--tpm2-pcrs=PCR[+PCR...]
Configures the TPM2 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) to
bind to when enrollment is requested via --tpm2-device=. Takes
a list of PCR entries, where each entry starts with a name or
numeric index in the range 0...23, optionally followed by ":"
and a hash algorithm name (specifying the PCR bank),
optionally followed by "=" and a hash digest value. Multiple
PCR entries are separated by "+". If an empty string is
specified, binds the enrollment to no PCRs at all (this is
also the default, if this option is not used). See the table
above for a list of available PCRs.
Example:
--tpm2-pcrs=boot-loader-code+platform-config+boot-loader-config
specifies that PCR registers 4, 1, and 5 should be used.
Example: --tpm2-pcrs=7:sha256 specifies that PCR register 7
from the SHA256 bank should be used.
Example:
--tpm2-pcrs=4:sha1=3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275
specifies that PCR register 4 from the SHA1 bank should be
used, and a hash digest value of
3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275 will be used instead
of reading the current PCR value.
Added in version 248.
--tpm2-with-pin=BOOL
When enrolling a TPM2 device, controls whether to require the
user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume in addition to
PCR binding, based on TPM2 policy authentication. Defaults to
"no". Despite being called PIN, any character can be used, not
just numbers.
Note that incorrect PIN entry when unlocking increments the
TPM dictionary attack lockout mechanism, and may lock out
users for a prolonged time, depending on its configuration.
The lockout mechanism is a global property of the TPM,
systemd-cryptenroll does not control or configure the lockout
mechanism. You may use tpm2-tss tools to inspect or configure
the dictionary attack lockout, with tpm2_getcap(1) and
tpm2_dictionarylockout(1) commands, respectively.
Added in version 251.
--tpm2-public-key=PATH, --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=PCR[+PCR...],
--tpm2-signature=PATH
Configures a TPM2 signed PCR policy to bind encryption to. The
--tpm2-public-key= option accepts a path to a PEM encoded RSA
public key, to bind the encryption to. If this is not
specified explicitly, but a file tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem
exists in one of the directories /etc/systemd/, /run/systemd/,
/usr/lib/systemd/ (searched in this order), it is
automatically used. The --tpm2-public-key-pcrs= option takes a
list of TPM2 PCR indexes to bind to (same syntax as
--tpm2-pcrs= described above). If not specified, defaults to
11 (i.e. this binds the policy to any unified kernel image for
which a PCR signature can be provided).
Note the difference between --tpm2-pcrs= and
--tpm2-public-key-pcrs=: the former binds decryption to the
current, specific PCR values; the latter binds decryption to
any set of PCR values for which a signature by the specified
public key can be provided. The latter is hence more useful in
scenarios where software updates shall be possible without
losing access to all previously encrypted LUKS2 volumes. Like
with --tpm2-pcrs=, names defined in the table above can also
be used to specify the registers, for instance
--tpm2-public-key-pcrs=boot-loader-code+system-identity.
The --tpm2-signature= option takes a path to a TPM2 PCR
signature file as generated by the systemd-measure(1) tool. If
this is not specified explicitly, a suitable signature file
tpm2-pcr-signature.json is searched for in /etc/systemd/,
/run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/ (in this order) and used. If
a signature file is specified or found it is used to verify if
the volume can be unlocked with it given the current PCR
state, before the new slot is written to disk. This is
intended as safety net to ensure that access to a volume is
not lost if a public key is enrolled for which no valid
signature for the current PCR state is available. If the
supplied signature does not unlock the current PCR state and
public key combination, no slot is enrolled and the operation
will fail. If no signature file is specified or found no such
safety verification is done.
Added in version 252.
--tpm2-pcrlock=PATH
Configures a TPM2 pcrlock policy to bind encryption to.
Expects a path to a pcrlock policy file as generated by the
systemd-pcrlock(8) tool. If a TPM2 device is enrolled and this
option is not used but a file pcrlock.json is found in
/run/systemd/ or /var/lib/systemd/ it is automatically used.
Assign an empty string to turn this behaviour off.
Added in version 255.
The following additional options are understood:
--wipe-slot=SLOT[,SLOT...]
Wipes one or more LUKS2 key slots. Takes a comma separated
list of numeric slot indexes, or the special strings "all"
(for wiping all key slots), "empty" (for wiping all key slots
that are unlocked by an empty passphrase), "password" (for
wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a traditional
passphrase), "recovery" (for wiping all key slots that are
unlocked by a recovery key), "pkcs11" (for wiping all key
slots that are unlocked by a PKCS#11 token), "fido2" (for
wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a FIDO2 token),
"tpm2" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a TPM2
chip), or any combination of these strings or numeric indexes,
in which case all slots matching either are wiped. As safety
precaution an operation that wipes all slots without exception
(so that the volume cannot be unlocked at all anymore, unless
the volume key is known) is refused.
This switch may be used alone, in which case only the
requested wipe operation is executed. It may also be used in
combination with any of the enrollment options listed above,
in which case the enrollment is completed first, and only when
successful the wipe operation executed — and the newly added
slot is always excluded from the wiping. Combining enrollment
and slot wiping may thus be used to update existing
enrollments:
systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto
The above command will enroll the TPM2 chip, and then wipe all
previously created TPM2 enrollments on the LUKS2 volume,
leaving only the newly created one. Combining wiping and
enrollment may also be used to replace enrollments of
different types, for example for changing from a PKCS#11
enrollment to a FIDO2 one:
systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=pkcs11 --fido2-device=auto
Or for replacing an enrolled empty password by TPM2:
systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto
Added in version 248.
--list-devices
Show a list of candidate block devices this command may
operate on. Specifically, this enumerates block devices
currently present that contain a LUKS superblock, and shows
their device node paths along with any of their symlinks. The
devices must implement the hmac-secret extension to be
useable.
Added in version 257.
-h, --help
Print a short help text and exit.
--version
Print a short version string and exit.
--no-pager
Do not pipe output into a pager.
systemd-cryptenroll supports the service credentials logic as
implemented by ImportCredential=/LoadCredential=/SetCredential=
(see systemd.exec(5) for details). The following credentials are
used when passed in:
cryptenroll.passphrase, cryptenroll.new-passphrase
May contain the passphrase to unlock the volume with/to newly
enroll.
Added in version 256.
cryptenroll.tpm2-pin, cryptenroll.new-tpm2-pin
May contain the TPM2 PIN to unlock the volume with/to newly
enroll.
Added in version 256.
cryptenroll.fido2-pin
If a FIDO2 token is enrolled this may contain the PIN of the
token.
Added in version 256.
cryptenroll.pkcs11-pin
If a PKCS#11 token is enrolled this may contain the PIN of the
token.
Added in version 256.
On success, 0 is returned, a non-zero failure code otherwise.
crypttab(5) and systemd-measure(1) contain various examples
employing systemd-cryptenroll.
systemd(1), systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8), crypttab(5),
cryptsetup(8), systemd-measure(1)
1. Linux TPM PCR Registry
https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/linux_tpm_pcr_registry/
This page is part of the systemd (systemd system and service
manager) project. Information about the project can be found at
⟨http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd⟩. If you have a
bug report for this manual page, see
⟨http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/#bugreports⟩.
This page was obtained from the project's upstream Git repository
⟨https://github.com/systemd/systemd.git⟩ on 2025-02-02. (At that
time, the date of the most recent commit that was found in the
repository was 2025-02-02.) If you discover any rendering
problems in this HTML version of the page, or you believe there is
a better or more up-to-date source for the page, or you have
corrections or improvements to the information in this COLOPHON
(which is not part of the original manual page), send a mail to
man-pages@man7.org
systemd 258~devel SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)
Pages that refer to this page: systemd-creds(1), crypttab(5), repart.d(5), systemd.directives(7), systemd.index(7), systemd-stub(7), systemd-cryptsetup(8), systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8), systemd-pcrlock(8), systemd-repart(8)
|
HTML rendering created 2025-02-02 by Michael Kerrisk, author of The Linux Programming Interface. For details of in-depth Linux/UNIX system programming training courses that I teach, look here. Hosting by jambit GmbH. |
|